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High Efficient Secret Key Distillation for Long Distance Continuous Variable
Quantum Key Distribution
Yi-Bo Zhao,∗ Zheng-Fu Han,† Jin-Jian Chen, You-Zhen Gui, and Guang-Can Guo
Key Lab of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, (CAS), Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
The continuous variable quantum key distribution is expected to provide high secret key rate
without single photon source and detector, but the lack of the secure and effective key distillation
method makes it unpractical. Here, we present a secure single-bit-reverse-reconciliation protocol
combined with secret information concentration and post-selection, which can distill the secret
key with high efficiency and low computational complexity. The simulation results show that this
protocol can provide high secret key rate even when the transmission fiber is longer than 150km,
which may make the continuous variable scheme to outvie the single photon one.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+c
Recently, many approaches for quantum key distribu-
tion have been put forward, which may be divided into
two major types, single photon one [1, 2] and continuous
variable one [3, 4, 5, 6]. The former needs single pho-
ton detector and single photon source or weak coherent
source [2], therefore the high secret key rate becomes a
hot topic. Fortunately, the continuous variable quantum
key distribution (CVQKD) is potentially to provide high
secret key rate even for long transmission distance [6],
and only requires the coherent light source as well as the
homodyne detection. Many experiments show the physi-
cal possibility of this scheme [6, 7, 8]. However, unlike the
single photon one, after the quantum transmission pro-
cess, the CVQKD only provides continuously distributed
raw key elements [6] that should be converted into binary
keys. Although its potential has been demonstrated, how
to distill the secret key is still an open problem. Firstly,
some information will be certainly lost or leaked during
the distillation. Secondly, if taking the concrete distilla-
tion into account, Eve’s attack may be much more sophis-
ticated than that considered in Refs. [3, 4, 5, 6]. When
the channel loss is high, the maximum mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob is only slightly higher than
that between Eve and Bob, and it is possible that even
if the CVQKD could be proved unconditionally secure,
any secure binary key could not be distilled.
The only existing reconciliation protocol was proposed
by Assche et al [9], and used in current experimental
demonstrations [6]. In the protocol, they subtly com-
bined the quantization with error correction and tried
the best to reduce publicly exchanged information. How-
ever, it is effective only when the quantum channel loss
is small [3, 6]. In Ref. [6], the error correction block size
for the reconciliation was selected as 50 000, which is al-
ready very complex to implement, but only within 3.1
dB loss, could a secret key be distilled. In fact, the basic
assumption of the previous security proofs of CVQKD
is perfect, i.e. an ideal reconciliation that can convert
the continuous-element into common bits without any
auxiliary tactics. However, such reconciliation cannot be
realized under the high loss condition because the error
correction it demands will be too complex to implement
[10]. Therefore, a feasible reconciliation is necessary to
show the practical security of the CVQKD.
In the following, we present a single-bit-reverse-
reconciliation protocol to convert the element into com-
mon bits, after which large portion of secret information
can still be kept secret from Eve. We prove that Eve’s
attack is based on a Markov chain under the condition
of no excess noise, and under the noisy condition, Eve’s
tapped additional information can be eliminated. Then
we show this protocol to be secure, which is also a prac-
tical security proof for the CVQKD. In this protocol we
concentrate the secret information into certain bits, ex-
pose other useless information and flexibly employ some
tactics, such as post-selection, to keep Eve at a disadvan-
tage, and then the computational complexity is largely
reduced. With this protocol, 18% of the theoretical maxi-
mum keys can be distilled at 100km transmission distance
(0.01dB loss) and even at 150km transmission distance
(0.001dB loss) the secret keys can still be distilled.
Here, we discuss the CVQKD scheme of reference [6],
namely the Gaussian modulated coherent state scheme.
Suppose Alice and Bob’s x and p quadratures are Ax,
Ap, Bxand Bp respectively, Alice’s modulation variance
is VAN0, where N0 denotes the shot noise variance, and
Alice, Bob and Eve’s raw key elements are a, b and c
respectively. In this scheme we require that Alice and
Bob estimate the conditional entropy and distribution
between them. Then the single-bit-reverse-reconciliation
protocol runs as follows.
1. Alice slices her raw key element space into regions,
and denotes those regions with natural numbers in the
order as shown in Fig.1. The width of each region must
be much smaller than the variance of Eve’s and Bob’s
estimates of Alice’s quadratures.
2, Alice sorts her regions into pairs, making sure that
each region belongs to only one pair. The distance be-
2FIG. 1: An example of the pairing method, where identical
colors have been used to denote the two parties of one pair.
tween two parties of one pair is δa. For example, we can
select pairs by combining 4 with -4, 1 with 8, 2 with 9,
. . . , m with m+7, and so on.
3. Alice converts her key elements into binary bits
according to whether they belong to the left or the right
regions of their pairs. If a certain element belongs to the
left region of one pair, Alice designates it as 0, and if
to the right hand side, as 1. Then she tells Bob which
pair each of her raw key elements belongs to, but without
exposing her designated bit results. For example, if one
of Alice’s key elements belongs to region 2 or 9, then she
sends the pairing sign 2-9 to Bob, and assigns it as 0 or
1 correspondingly. The slicing, sorting and assignment
methods are publicly known.
4. According to Alice’s pairing sign and his own re-
sults, Bob calculates the conditional probabilities P (0|b),
P (1|b) [14] and the bit error rate (BER) of each of his key
elements, where P (1|b) and P (0|b) denote the probability
that Alice assigns her data as 1or 0, while Bob’s measure-
ment is b. The BER actually is min[P (0|b), P (1|b)]. Then
Bob divides his elements into 0 or 1 according to which of
P (0|b)and P (1|b) is bigger. What should be emphasized
is that the channel may be binary asymmetric.
5. After many such communications, Alice and Bob
share a series of binary strings. Then Bob discards those
bits with high BER and sorts remained bits into groups
according to the BERs and pairing information to make
it convenient for further error correction, privacy amplifi-
cation and so on. For example, he sorts those bits of one
pair with approximately identical BERs into one group.
Later, Bob tells Alice which group each of her bits be-
longs to.
6. Bob sends the appropriate error correction informa-
tion of each group to Alice. After error correction, Alice
and Bob share a series of common binary strings. Then
through privacy amplification [11], they thus finally have
a common secret key.
In the coherent state scheme, depending on Alice’s
quadratures and Eve’s attack, the entropy of Bob’s
measurement satisfies [3]: H(Bx|Ex) + H(Bp|Ap) ≥
2H0, where Ex represents the tapped result of Eve,
H(·|·)denotes the conditional entropy and H0 is the en-
tropy of a quadrature of the vacuum state. Because Bob
randomly chooses x or p for his measurement, the se-
cret key rate guaranteed by the reverse reconciliation is
△I = I(A : B) − I(B : E) = H(B|E) −H(B|A), where
I(·|·) denotes the mutual information. In the same way,
we also have H(Bx|Ex, Ax) +H(Bp|Ap) ≥ 2H0.
We will first discuss the case without excess noise [6].
The states that Alice sends to Bob are coherent states, so
that H(Bx|Ax) +H(Bp|Ap) = 2H0. In the channel esti-
mation, Alice and Bob should estimate the conditional
entropy exactly, which means that any eavesdropping
should maintainH(B|c, A) = H(B|A). Then we obtain:
△I = I(A : B|E) (1)
From △I = I(A : B)− I(B : E) and Eq.(1) we have:
H(B,E|A) = H(E|A) +H(B|A) (2)
On the other hand, Alice sends Bob the coherent state
|a〉, which is attenuated to |√Ga〉 by the time it arrives
at Bob when the channel transmission is G. Thereby,
under the case of Gaussian modulation, the distributions
of a and b can be written as:
P (a) =
1√
2piVAN0
exp(− a
2
2VAN0
) (3)
P (b|a) = 1√
2piN0
exp[− (
√
Ga− b)2
2N0
] (4)
The coherent state guarantees the conditional distribu-
tion P (b|a) to be the distribution with the minimum shot
noise, and since Eve cannot know which quadrature Bob
will choose to measure, after many communications Al-
ice and Bob can employ, for example, the normality test
to limit Eve’s tapped information. Any of her attacks
should maintain the conditional distribution of Eq.(4),
which means P (b|a) = P (b|a, c).
We can then obtain P (b, c|a) = P (c|a)P (b|a, c) =
P (c|a)P (b|a) and P (c, a|b) = P (c|a)P (b|a)P (a)/P (b) =
P (c|a)P (a|b).
Thus
P (c|b) =
∫
P (c|a)P (a|b)da (5)
P (b|c) =
∫
P (b|a)P (a|c)da (6)
Eqs.(1) (2) (5) and (6) show that under the condition that
Alice’s quadratures are known, Bob’s and Eve’s measure-
ments are independent. They also illustrate that, for re-
verse CVQKD, if there is no excess noise, any eavesdrop-
ping of Bob’s information is equivalent to a Markov chain
3of Eve→ Alice→ Bob, which means that for the reverse
scheme, the information can be regarded as having been
sent by Bob, received by Alice, and then transmitted to
Eve by Alice. All of Eve’s information about Bob is ob-
tained from Alice. To estimate Bob’s result, at first Eve
should estimate Alice’s quadrature, which is restricted by
the direct reconciliation schemes [12]
After Alice announces her paring information, Eve can
only know that Alice’s sent state is equivalent to |a0〉 or
|a0 + δa〉, where |a0〉 describes Alice’s certain sent state.
After Bob publics his grouping information, Eve knows
the channel properties between Alice and Bob, but her
estimates of Bob’s result are still based on her estimates
of Alice’s quadrature. To Eve, the probability of Bob’s
assignment results is P (b → 1|c) = P (|a0 + δa〉|c)P (b →
1||a0 + δa〉) + P (|a0〉|c)P (b → 1||a0〉), where b → 1 cor-
respond to Bob assigning his data as 1 and P (|a0〉|c) de-
scribes the probability that Alice has sent |a0〉 while Eve’s
result is c. min[P (b→ 1|c), P (b→ 0|c)] actually denotes
Eve’s BER. It shows that after the assignment the binary
channel is a binary Markov chain of Bob→ Alice→ Eve.
If Eve cannot estimate Alice’s result correctly, she cannot
estimate Bob’s correctly. The final amount of practical
secret keys can be given by
△I = n
∑
G
P (G)[IBG(A : B)− IBG(E : B)] (7)
where n denotes the number of raw key elements,
∑
G
means summation over the groups, P (G) describes the
probability of the groups, and IBG(· : ·) denotes the mu-
tual information of a group after their exposure. We see
that because of the Markov chain IBG(A : B) ≥ IBG(E :
B) is always maintained [13]. Through Alice’s pairing
information and Bob’s grouping information, the trans-
mission characteristics of the binary channel between Al-
ice and Bob can be given. The properties of the channel
between Eve and Alice are discussed in many direct rec-
onciliation schemes [12]. Then the maximum information
tapped by Eve can also be given.
If Bob sorts those bits of a pair with roughly the
same BER into one group, for a certain group and pair,
IBG(A : B) = HBG(A) −
∑
Group PG(b)Γ[P (0|b)], where
HBG(·) denotes the Shannon entropy of the distribution
of 0 and 1 in a certain group,
∑
Group denotes sum-
mation in the group, PG(·) is the distribution within
the group, depending on Bob’s grouping method, and
Γ(λ) = −λ log2 λ − (1 − λ) log2(1 − λ) is the Shannon
entropy.
The mutual information of a group between Eve
and Bob can be given by IBG(E : B) = HBG(B) −∫
PG(c)Γ[P (b → 1|c)]dc. The minimum noise on Alice’s
side in estimating Eve’s quadrature is given by reference
[12]: NE = N0 +
GN0
1−G =
N0
1−G . For the minimum Gaus-
sian noise case, we have the conditional distributions:
P (c|a) = 1√
2piαNE
exp[− (
√
αa−c)2
2αNE
], where α is a param-
eter which do not affect the final results. Then by the
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FIG. 2: Simulation results for secret key rate versus transmis-
sion line distance. Dashed line: theoretical key rate from Ref.
[6]; solid line: practical key rate from our simulation result
using the above method; dotted line: efficiency defined as the
ratio of the practical to the theoretical key rates
grouping information, PG(c), P (|a0〉|c) and consequently
IBG(E : B) can be obtained. The concrete calculation
is complex and depending on Bob’s grouping method.
Here, we only give the simulation results.
The simulation results of the binary secret key rate
as a function of the channel transmission distance are
shown in Fig.2, where we have set δa = (1+0.02L)
√
NE ,
VA = 500 and the width of the region δa/7 and L is
the transmission distance in the unit of km. The pairing
method is that shown in Fig.1, and the bits of both Alice
and Bob are sorted into groups with roughly the same
BER, while those bits with too high a BER, higher than
40%, are discarded. In the simulation we see that the
maximum efficiency, defined as the ratio of the practical
to the theoretical secret key rates, is about 37%. At
the distance of 100km, the efficiency is 18%, the BER
between Alice and Eve is higher than 4% and the secret
information per final bit carries is approximately equal
that per key element carries. Even for long distances
approaching 150km the efficiency is about 0.15%. While
in Ref. [6], they distilled the key only within 3.1dB loss
(15km fiber). For long distances the BER between Alice
and Bob is increased, so many bits should be discarded
to reduce the computational complexity, at the cost of
lower efficiency.
When the channel has excess noise ξN0, we have
VB|A = (1+Gξ)N0 [6], where V·|· denotes the conditional
variance, so H(B|A) = H0+0.5 log2(1+Gξ) = H0+H ′.
Under this condition through entropy estimation Alice
and Bob may not be able to find a lurking Eve when
H(B|A, c) ≥ H(B|A) − 2H ′, and then the secret key
rate becomes △I = I(A : B|E) − 2H ′. Obviously, this
case is not always a Markov chain. In this situation
Eve can do entangling cloner attack, using a noiseless
line to replace the noise one between Alice and Bob and
injecting an entangled beam into the line to tap more
of Bob’s information [6]. However, under this case, the
4maximum variance change caused by the entangled beam
cannot exceed that of the excess noise, so the maxi-
mum additional information Eve can attack is Iadd =
0.5 log2[VB|A/min(Vvacuum)] = 0.5 log2(V
2
B|A/N
2
0 ) =
2H ′ bits [13, 15], where min(Vvacuum) denotes the mini-
mum variance of vacuum noise. Moreover, previous anal-
yses show that I(A : B|E) is only determined by the
Markov chain. Thus, this process is equivalent to that
besides through the previous Markov chain Eve can ob-
tain additional information of 2H ′ bits from Bob. It can
be proved that the exactly same result in reference [6] can
be derived by this way. Therefore, at first Alice and Bob
can suppose the channel is still a Markov chain, and es-
timate the maximum information tapped by Eve. If the
results satisfy △I > 2H ′, Alice and Bob can still distill
a secret key, but the final amount should be subtracted
by 2nH ′ bits. Then the amount of secret keys becomes:
△I = n{∑G P (G)[IBG(A : B)− IBG(E : B)]− 2H ′}.
What should be noticed is that if there is excess noise,
the conditional distribution of Bob and Eve’s measure-
ments will all be changed correspondingly. The NE will
become N0+N0/(
1−G
G
+ξ) [12]. If the efficiency is 100%,
only when ξ < 0.5, can the secret key be distilled [6]. If
the reconciliation efficiency is γ, it requires ξ < 0.5γ,
which can be improved by choose proper post-selection.
In this protocol, after Alice and Bob’s exposure, the as-
signment process is equivalent to binary modulation, but
Eve’s attack is still limited by CVQKD. To reduce the
computational complexity, we should concentrate the se-
cret information into certain bits and increase the differ-
ence between Eve’s minimum BER and Alice’s BER [10].
In this protocol we see that if there is no excess noise the
channel is a Markov chain, so if the BER between Alice
and Eve is maintained nonzero, then the BER between
Eve and Bob is certainly larger than that between Alice
and Bob [16]. Alice and Bob can use post-selection, dis-
carding those bits with a high BER between them. Then
the BER of remained bits between Eve and Bob will be
sufficiently larger than that between Alice and Bob, so
the complexity of the error correction can be significantly
reduced [10]. For example, if the BER between Alice and
Bob of remained bits is below 15%, while that between
Eve and Alice is maintained to be 25%, then the differ-
ence between the BER between Eve and Bob and that
between Alice and Bob is larger than 17%. In addition,
to reduce the computational complexity and increase the
secret key rate we should choose an appropriate value for
δa, since δa affects both the BER between Alice and Bob
and that between Alice and Eve. We slice Alice’s raw key
element space into very small regions, mainly because by
doing so Alice and Bob can estimate their BERs exactly.
Moreover, Bob should sort his binary strings into dif-
ferent groups according to the BERs, because the bits
with different BERs may contribute different amounts of
secret key, and require different error corrections.
In this letter, we show that under the condition of no
excess noise Eve’s attack is based on a Markov chain in
the reverse reconciliation CVQKD scheme, and the excess
noise will only cause additional information loss, which
can be easily subtracted in the final result. Then we
propose a secure single-bit-reverse-reconciliation proto-
col, with low computational complexity. The numerical
simulation results show that almost 18% of the theoret-
ical maximum secret information can be distilled by the
protocol with low computational complexity even when
the transmission fiber is longer than 100km.
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